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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Throughout the last couple of decades, the individual income tax systems of most 
industrialized countries have been (repeatedly) the subject of considerable reform efforts. 
Many OECD countries have implemented tax reforms characterized by base broadening, 
reduction of tax rates and flattening of the rate structure. Recently, the focus has also 
been on lower tax-to-GDP ratios. For example, the German government carried out a 
major tax reform in 2000; the package implies a tax reduction amounting to EUR 25 billion 
annually in 2005. The Netherlands has just implemented a major reform.1 The new Income 
Tax Act 2001 creates a system with a broader base and lower rates, introduces tax credits 
and makes a fundamental change in capital taxation.  
 
Remarkably enough, when the plans for this reform were discussed (and enacted) in the 
parliament, members of parliament were already expressing  interest in a  new  tax reform. 
Specifically, they asked the government to investigate the possibilities (or impossibilities) 
of a flat rate individual income tax. Various proposals for a flat tax have been made in 
other countries, especially in the United States.2 The meaning of a “flat tax'” is somewhat 
ambiguous in political debates and in the economic literature, but generally, a flat rate tax 
system has two key features: a very broad tax base and one fixed rate.  Implementing a 
flat rate individual income tax in the Netherlands seems to be in line with earlier reforms, 
and could be seen as a major - final? - tax reform. 
  
In this article, we show some of the main effects of such a system. We simulate a very 
simple flat rate individual income tax system for the Netherlands and compare the 
distribution of the current individual income tax (including social contributions) to the 
                                                 
1
  See Gerard Meussen, “Income Tax Act 2001”, 40 European Taxation 11 (2000), p. 490 and Frank P.G. 
Pötgens and Hans C. Bol, “International Aspects of the 2001 Income Tax Act”, 41 European Taxation 1 
(2001), p. 1. 
2. See, for example, The Economist, America's Tax Reform, 13 January 1996, pp. 52-54 and 
http://www.senate.gov/comm/jec/general/fltxrept.html. Earlier proposals for the United States can be 
found in R.E. Hall and A. Rabushka, The Flat Tax, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985); A.L. Feld, 
"Living with the Flat Tax", National Tax Journal 1995 (48), at 603-618; A.B. Atkinson, Public Economics in 
Action: The Basic Income/Flat Tax Proposal, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). See also a European 
proposal from N.K. Frederiksen, A Dynamic General Equilibrium Simulation Model for Fiscal Policy 
Analysis, (Copenhagen Business School:  EPRU Economic Studies 1/1994) . 
 2 
distribution of the simulated flat rate tax.3 Essentially, the effects are simulated of eliminat-
ing deductions in exchange for a reduction in tax rates sufficient to keep individual income 
tax revenue constant. Under ”our” flat tax, a uniform proportional rate is levied on a very 
broad individual income base, while only fixed personal exemptions are deductible from 
pre-tax incomes (i.e. a tax credit). For our analysis we use an extensive income survey of 
Statistics Netherlands, which covers 217,000 income recipients. Sample data have been 
combined with data from the tax administration. As a result, the survey contains the 
personal distribution of incomes (pre-tax, taxable and after-tax), the distribution of tax 
liabilities and almost all deductions. 
 
The article is organized as follows. Section II. evaluates the pros and cons of 
implementing a flat rate individual income tax. In section III. the individual income tax 
reform in the Netherlands is described briefly. Section IV. presents the characteristics of 
the simulated flat tax, while the income effects of such a tax are illustrated in section V.  
 
 
II.   DO WE NEED A FLAT TAX? 
 
Proponents argue that a broad base/flat rate tax system generates fewer complexities 
than most current individual income tax systems, which cause high administrative costs.4 
Administrative and compliance costs of the current income tax and social contributions in 
the Netherlands, for example, appear to be 4.8% of corresponding revenues.5 The 
elimination of deductions - base broadening - could decrease these costs significantly. 
 
Secondly, an obvious reason for lower rates is the distortionary effects of high marginal tax 
rates on, e.g. labour supply and savings.6 However, according to the OECD Jobs Study 
(1994) on tax reforms in the 1980s, the positive effects of lower tax rates on labour supply 
seem rather small7 and in particular the effects on the male labour supply seem to be very 
low. 
 
Thirdly, a flat rate tax system with a very broad base would both alleviate distortions and 
reduce the quantity of tax arbitrage options open to taxpayers in the current system. Under 
current Netherlands income tax law capital income is  taxed on average much less than 
labour income. This is the result of political interests (owner-occupied property), social 
considerations (pension contributions) and economic reasons (capital flight). The lower tax 
                                                 
3.  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the seminar “Tax Reform 2001: Politics and Science in 
Debate”, 10 December 1999, Rotterdam. In an earlier stage of our research project we have benefited 
from discussions with, and helpful comments from, Wouter Bos, Sybren Cnossen, Casper van Ewijk, Flip 
De Kam,  Peter B. Sørensen and Henk Vording. 
4. Cf. C.E. McLure Jr, "International Implications of the Flat Tax", 50 Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation  11/12  (1996),  pp.  511-515. 
5. That is, costs of private households (filing of tax returns), cost of business (withholding), and cost of the 
Treasury (administration). See M.A. Allers, Administrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation and Public 
Transfers in the Netherlands, (Groningen:  Wolters-Noordhoff,  1994). 
6. Cf. N.K. Frederiksen, 1996, note 2. 
7. OECD, The OECD Jobs Study: Evidence and Explanations,  Parts 1 and 2, (OECD: Paris, 1994). 
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burden is visible in the most important forms of capital income: the rental value of owner-
occupied property is taxed negatively, pension savings are taxed on a deferred basis, 
investment income of pension funds is exempt and retained profits are taxed 
proportionally.8 Also, the portfolio allocation of savings and risk-taking is influenced by the 
tax rules. Individual savings for pension schemes or contributions for life insurance are 
deductible from pre-tax income, while other savings are (in general) not. The effective tax 
rate on investment can therefore range from minus 60% to 74% in the Netherlands.9 By 
allowing the size of the tax wedge to vary widely, current taxation violates one of the most 
fundamental rules of the market, which is that economic considerations instead of tax 
motives should determine choices regarding the organization, financing and location of 
activities.  
 
Opponents of the flat tax proposal reject the idea on the basis of equity considerations: 
higher income groups would pay less tax in a flat rate system than in a progressive tax 
system. Low and high income earners will be taxed at the same marginal rate. On the 
basis of the ability-to-pay principle, one could argue in favour of a progressive rate 
structure.10 Moreover, some deductions seem to be fair when the ability-to-pay principle is 
employed: for example, if there are high expenses for sickness, ability to pay will be lower. 
A deduction therefore seems logical. 
 
Secondly, the elimination of all deductions and allowances conflicts with the taxable 
income concept mainly because costs of earning income should be deductible from pre-
tax income.11 
 
Thirdly, drastic base broadening can have substantial adverse economic effects. For 
example, elimination of the deduction for pension contributions would no doubt affect 
savings, and the elimination of the deduction of mortgage interest payments would disturb 
the housing market. Timing and capitalization problems are also relevant here. Thus, a 
drastic reform as envisaged in our analysis would in any case require a rather long 
transition period. 
 
The flat tax to be elaborated for the Netherlands differs to a wide extent from several 
recent proposals in the United States.12 Usually, the focus is on a proportional tax rate on 
labour income, allowing a fixed personal exemption: capital income remains untaxed (the 
Hall-Rabuska type of flat tax exempts the normal return on capital). Under strict conditions, 
such a proportional wage tax is equivalent to a proportional spending tax or consumption-
                                                 
8. Further details can be found in S. Cnossen, "Towards a New Tax Covenant", De Economist 1995 (143),  
pp. 285-315. 
9. Distributed profits are taxed highest (74%) as a result of the classical system, while the effective tax rate of 
capital gains will be minus 60% if the investment is financed by foreign capital. 
10. See F.G. van Herwaarden and C.A. De Kam, "An Operational Concept of the Ability to Pay Principle (with 
an Application for the Netherlands, 1973)",  De Economist  1983 (131), pp. 55-64. 
11. L.G.M. Stevens, "Dual Income Tax Systems: A European Challenge?", EC Tax Review 1996 (5), pp. 
6-12. 
12. See proposals by the Joint Economic Committee http://www.senate.gov/comm/jec/general/ fltxrept.html. 
 4 
based tax.13 Therefore, one could argue that these proposals are ”America-inspired”, since 
they offer an alternative for both the current income tax and for the value added tax (there 
is no VAT in the United States).14 
 
A flat tax is distinct from a ”dual income tax” as implemented in several Scandinavian 
countries,15 and as proposed by Cnossen  for the Netherlands.16 The dual income tax is 
mainly advocated for efficiency considerations (fewer distortions, less tax arbitrage). It 
disregards the principle of ability to pay, that is, that all sources of income should be taxed 
equivalently.17 
 
Below we outline a flat individual income tax, which includes labour income as well as 
capital income in the same tax base (as does current Netherlands income tax law).  
 
 
III. NETHERLANDS TAX REFORM 
 
In September 1999 draft legislation for the new Income Tax Act 2001 was submitted to 
the Lower House of the parliament together with draft legislation on its implementation.18 
These bills represent the core of a major revision of the Netherlands tax system known 
as the Revision of Taxation 2001. Both bills were accepted by the Lower House of the 
parliament on 3 February 2000 and have been ratified by the Upper House. The new 
Income Tax Act 2001 came into effect on 1 January 2001. 
 
The Income Tax Act 2001 creates a system with a broader base and lower rates. Work 
is be made more attractive by the introduction of an employment rebate (fixed tax credit). 
The reduction in the tax on labour is to be financed by reductions in total public 
expenditure and by increases in indirect taxes, such as VAT and environmental levies 
(amounting to EUR 3.6 billion or 1% of GDP). The reform package results in a tax 
reduction of EUR 2.7 billion (0.8% of GDP). 
 
The system should ensure more stable tax revenues. Under the current system, it is 
possible to convert some taxable income, for example interest and dividends, into non-
taxable capital gains. The new system will restrict the scope and effect of such 
conversions. 
 
The former income tax system was based on one aggregated taxable income from 
several sources. Various deductions could be applied. Under the new system, personal 
                                                 
13. J.A. Pechman, "The Future of the Income Tax", American Economic Review 1990 (80), pp. 1-20. 
14. Cf. A.F. Feld, note 2. 
15. P.B. Sørensen, "From the Global Income Tax to the Dual Income Tax: Recent Tax Reforms in the Nordic 
Countries", International Tax and Public Finance 1994 (1), pp. 57-79. 
16. S. Cnossen, "Towards a New Tax Covenant", De Economist 1995 (143), pp. 285-315. 
17. Cf. L.G.M. Stevens,  note 11. 
18. "Income Tax Reform Act 2001" (“Voorstel van Wet IB 2001”). TKstuk 1998-1999, 26 728, No.2, The Hague, 
1999. 
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allowances are replaced by a levy rebate in the form of a uniform individualized tax 
credit. Three taxable incomes are distinguished, each of which falls into a box. Income is 
taxed in one box only (no double taxation). Negative income in one box cannot be set off 
against positive income in other boxes. Each box has its own rate structure: 
 
Box 1: Taxable income from work and home ownership, to be taxed at progressive 
rates from 32.35% to 52%;  
Box 2: Taxable income from a substantial (business) interest, to be taxed at one fixed 
rate of 25%; and 
Box 3: Taxable income from savings and investments, to be taxed at one fixed rate of 
30%. The new investment yield tax is levied on capital and assets minus 
outstanding debts in any one year. Capital and assets include shares and 
savings deposits, land and property (other than the principal residence), and 
other (movable) property not in personal use. To derive the “yield assessment 
base” a fixed fictitious yield of 4% per year will be employed. This fictitious yield 
is taxed at the rate of 30%.  
 
Almost all taxpayers are subject to taxation in box 1. Box 1 is expected to produce over 
95% of individual income tax revenue (including general social security contributions). In 
2001 the first income bracket (EUR 14,870) is taxed at 32.35%, i.e. a combination of taxes 
and social contributions. In the second income bracket – the next EUR 12,139 - the tax 
rate is set at 37.6%, also including general social security contributions. In the third income 
bracket - the next EUR 19,300 - the tax rate is set at 42%; taxable income above EUR 
46,309 is taxed at 52%. Senior citizens are taxed at a lower rate in the first and the second 
income brackets (14.45% and 19.7%, respectively), because those over 64 pay less in 
social contributions.  
 
The new Income Tax Act 2001 became effective on 1 January 2001. However, further 
reforms are called for. A vast majority of the Lower House of the parliament asked the 
Ministry of Finance to investigate the possibilities and impossibilities of a flat rate individual 
income tax.  
 
 
IV. THE SIMULATED FLAT TAX 
 
Under “our” flat tax, a uniform proportional rate is levied on a broad individual income 
base, whereby only fixed personal exemptions are deductible from pre-tax income. This is 
essentially a Bentham system. To derive the “new” broad tax base, we have eliminated 
almost all deductions for all taxpayers in the sample data.19  
                                                 
19. The flat individual income tax base is simulated by using data from an Income Survey of Statistics 
Netherlands. Unfortunately, cross-section data have a time lag of several years. We have therefore used 
the survey data of the fiscal year 1997, while making some small adjustments to simulate the situation for 
the year 1998. Some deductions, e.g. pension insurance contributions paid by employees and employers 
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Table 1 summarizes such a broad tax base for 1998 (upper-right part of the table). Since 
detailed data about the distribution of deductions are available, we are able to construct 
the new tax base for various income levels. 
 
Table 1   From Taxable Income to Tax Base of Flat Tax: Magnitude of Deductions 
 
 
  Tax Base 1998 x billion NLG * 
 
  Simulated Base Flat Tax  x billion NLG 
    
1 taxable income 417.9    taxable income flat rate tax (1+4) 526.3 
2 personal exemptions 100.8    personal exemptions (tax credit) 100.8 
   tax base (1-2) 317.1    tax base flat rate tax' (1+4-2) 425.5 
    
3  income tax revenue 118.0    revenue neutral  (ex ante) 118.0 
    
4 deductions / base-broadening 108.4   
   pension insurance contribution   26.0   
   mortgage interest -/- fiscal rents home-owners   23.3   
   work-related expenses   18.8    
   insurance contributions for sickness and 
   unemployment employees 
 
   6.5 
  
   contributions for life insurance    5.9   
   deduction for self-employed    5.4   
   deduction for senior citizens (over 65 years)      5.2   
   saving incentive for workers (spaarloon)    4.0   
   basic exemption for interest and dividends    3.2   
   deduction for exceptional (medical) costs    2.7   
   interest on consumer loans    2.6   
   deduction for non-workers    2.3   
   early retirement scheme contributions employees    1.5   
   deductible losses    1.0   
    
average rate:  3/(1-2) 37.2 %    flat rate:  3/(1+4-2) 27.7% 
 
*   1 Euro =  NLG 2.20371  
 
Source: Almost all of the figures in the left part of the table have been taken from the Ministry of Finance (White 
Paper on Tax Reform 2001 (Kabinetsverkenning Belastingen in de 21e eeuw), 1997, p. 19 and p. 37; 
TKstuk 1997 -1998 25 810 No.2, The Hague); exceptions are early retirement contributions (source: 
Statistics Netherlands Yearbook) and an updated figure for the (difference in the) deduction for 
mortgage interest - i.e. the cost of owner-occupied dwellings - and fictitious taxable fiscal rents for 
home-owners (source: K. Caminada, Aftrekpost eigen woning: wie profiteert in welke mate?, 
Department of Economics Research Memorandum 99.02, Leiden University, The Netherlands, 1999). 
 
As a result of the simulated base broadening, taxable income increases by 25.9%. This is 
the total of all deductions in the left part of Table 1 under point 4. Two-thirds of this 
increase is caused by only three large items: pension insurance contributions paid by 
employees and employers, mortgage interest payments and work-related expenses. As a 
                                                                                                                                                 
and early pension insurance paid by employees, are not included in the Income Survey data. We have 
therefore distributed these contributions to the relevant socio-economic groups using  computation rules. 
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result of the (extreme) broadening of the tax base the uniform tax rate can be set very low. 
With a flat rate of 27.7%, the same amount of revenue is generated as in the current 
system (ex ante). This flat rate is substantially lower compared to the statutory rate in the 
first bracket (36.35% in 1998; to be lowered to 32.35% in 2001). 
 
It should be mentioned that there are some problems with the concept we have used. The 
tax base we have constructed is a rather hybrid concept, which is, for example, far from 
the Haig-Simons definition of income.20 However, this article focuses on real-world tax 
reform, so we prefer to take actual taxable income as the starting point of our analysis, 
rather than a theoretical income concept. 
 
Also, one could argue that the system taxes twice in several ways. For example, pension 
benefits remain taxable, while the deductibility of pension contributions from gross 
earnings is eliminated. This is a price to be paid for a low flat rate. Moreover, there are 
already several examples of two-fold taxes in the present system. 
 
Another complication is that we do not include the corporate tax in our simulations. If the 
tax regime for the self-employed were to be altered, one could argue that this would also 
require changes in the corporate tax in order to prevent tax arbitrage. On the other hand, 
the level of the flat individual tax rate would be closer to the actual corporate tax rate. In 
general, tax rates on labour and capital would converge. This would substantially reduce 
the incentives for tax arbitrage. Relative prices rather than tax motives would determine 
economic behaviour, with clear welfare gains.  
 
 
V. DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS 
 
Figure 1 shows the effect of the tax reform on the distribution of average tax ratios. Income 
deciles are derived by dividing the total population deriving income into ten equal-sized 
groups according to the amount of their gross income. Decile 1 contains the poorest tenth 
of the population, decile 2 the second poorest and so on, up to the top decile (decile 10), 
which contains the richest tenth. The black blocks illustrate the simulated flat rate tax, 
while the distribution of average tax ratios under the current system is represented by grey 
blocks. In both cases average tax liability by income class is related to the broadly 
elaborated tax base: gross income (computed as current taxable income plus all applied 
deductions to be eliminated under a flat tax). 
                                                 
20. Income is defined as the amount an individual can consume in an given period of time without any 
reduction in wealth. H.C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1938). 
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Figure 1  Comparison Average Tax Ratios:
Actual System 1998 and Simulated Flat Rate Tax
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flat rate tax 27,7%
 
 
Note: Figures for the first decile are not shown because of specific factors that blur the picture (personal 
exemptions and statistical bias). 
 
Source: See Table 1 for the specification of current taxable income and the current deductions (to be 
eliminated in the simulated broad base flat rate tax); aggregated data are taken from the Ministry of 
Finance (1997); data to distribute these items to income classes are taken from Netherlands Personal 
Income Distribution 1997 (source: Statistics Netherlands, 2000, The Hague: SDU-uitgeverij) and the 
authors’ own calculations. 
 
 
The distribution of average tax ratios under current tax law depends on both the rate structure 
and the distribution of deductions. The distribution of applied deductions (aggregated by 
deciles) shows quite a bit of income elasticity; the deduction ratio increases sharply with gross 
income. Furthermore, the tax advantage of deductions shows even more income elasticity, 
because deductions are valued by the marginal tax rate of taxpayers. Accordingly, the 
distribution of the average tax ratios appears to be more equally distributed than suggested 
by the rate structure. Income tax progression is mainly the result of fixed personal 
exemptions,21 which are maintained under the simulated flat rate tax. 
Changes in tax liabilities caused by the flat tax can also be illustrated as a percentage of after-
tax income before the tax reform). Figure 2 illustrates the income effects of the flat tax. 
 
                                                 
21. Just as in many other OECD countries. According to J. Owens, most of the progressivity of the income tax 
derives from the fact that the first slice of income is free of tax; see Emerging Issues in Tax Reform: the 
Perspective of an International Administrator, paper presented at the 53rd IIPF Congress, 25 August  1997, 
Kyoto, Japan. For a detailed analysis, see K. Caminada and K.P. Goudswaard, "Progression and Revenue 
Effects of Income Tax Reform", International Tax and Public Finance 1996 (3),  pp.  57-66.  
 9 
Figure 2  Impact Flat Rate Tax on After Tax Income
(differences in percentage points)
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Source and note: See below figure 1.  
 
 
Very low income earners are the winners The income effects around the minimum wage 
income level (EUR 10,435 after tax for a sole earner) are negligible. A broad range of 
middle income earners are the losers: after-tax incomes decline 1.4% to 2.6% on average 
for the income classes between EUR 11,345 and EUR 38,570. These losses for middle 
income groups could be problematic from a political point of view, but the magnitude of the 
losses is limited in view of the radical reform. Very high income earners win. The positive 
income effect around EUR 38,570 after-tax income is estimated to be 5.1%.  
 
Surprisingly, for the vast majority of the taxpayers, effects on after-tax income are within a 
range of approximately 5%. The range of approximately 5% for income effects was also 
used as a reference by two committees making proposals on earlier Netherlands tax 
reforms, and were considered “acceptable”. The dramatic “reform” would not involve 
dramatic changes in after-tax income. It appears that for most taxpayers the loss of 
deductions is more or less compensated by the lower rate (see above).22 
 
Although eight decile groups lose out and only two decile groups win, the tax reform is 
revenue neutral (ex ante). The explanation for this is rather straightforward: very high 
                                                 
22. One could argue that the personal exemptions should be eliminated as well in order to create further 
simplicity in the tax system. We did an additional simulation to show the effects. As a result of the 
additional base broadening, a rate of 22.4% would balance the budget (ex ante). However, the effects on 
after-tax income would be substantial and would exceed the range of approximately 5% for the majority 
of  taxpayers. The main losers are very low income earners, while very high income earners would gain 
the most (even more compared to the Bentham variant of the flat tax). 
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income groups contribute heavily to the income tax. The share of the upper 10% in total 
tax revenue amounted to 37% in 1998. This would decline substantially (to 34%) under the 
flat rate tax. 
 
At this point we should, however, stress that we derived averages by income class. The 
effect on after-tax income for individuals will undoubtedly show variations around these 
averages. Unfortunately, we are not able to show this diversity because regulations on 
privacy do not allow Statistics Netherlands to provide more detailed data on deductions. 
When individual taxpayers make relatively more (or less) use of deductions compared to 
the average of an income class, income effects will be less negative or more positive, 
respectively. 
 
The income effects also vary by socio-economic group. The main losers are persons over 
64 years (-11.7%), because senior citizens are no longer taxed at a lower rate. The 
income effects for working people are, on average, small. Civil servants (-2.2%) will face a 
modest loss. On the other hand, employees in the private sector will face a modest gain 
(+1.3%). Civil servants lose compared to employees, due to their higher deductions for 
pension contributions. The negative effect of losing deductions on after-tax income seems 
- on average - to be of greater value for civil servants compared to the lower tax rate. For 
the self-employed both effects approximately set each other off (-0.7%). Apparent winners 
are those receiving unemployment (+3.7%), early retirement (+7.2%) or disability  
benefits(+4.3%). Their average use of deductions is relatively low (there are other reasons 
as well). 
 
Table 2 summarizes the effects by socio-economic group. 
 
Table 2  Effect of Flat Rate Tax: Averages Social Groups 1998 
 
  
level 
 
percentage change 
 
 tax ratio  tax ratio tax tax tax after-tax 
 
 
 
 
Individuals with 
pre-tax income 
x 1 000 actual flat tax base liability share income 
        
self-employed      745 23.8 24.3 47.4     2.0   0.2   -0.7 
employees (a)    5065 24.9 24.1 28.5    -3.0 -1.8    1.3 
civil servants      592 24.2 25.4 39.4     5.1   0.5   -2.2 
social welfare and unemployed      618 22.2 19.4   9.5  -12.7 -0.4    3.7 
disabled      460 24.1 21.2 10.7  -12.1 -0.4    4.3 
old-age pensioners    1872 12.4 21.3 15.5   71.6   4.7 -11.7 
early retirees (b)      395 28.4 23.7   8.9 -16.5 -0.8   7.2 
        
total / average (c) 11202 23.2 23.2 26.0    0.0   0.0    0.0 
 
(a)  including chief executives of firms (directeuren NV/BV). 
(b)  individuals with early retirement income benefits who are younger than 65 years of age. 
(c)  including individuals with gross income earned in less than 52 weeks. 
 
Sources: See below figure 1. 
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Finally, it should be noted that the simulated flat rate individual income tax is revenue-
neutral in comparison with the pre-2001 system. Compared to the Revision of Taxation 
2001 there would be substantial budgetary room to redress major distributional effects of 
the income tax reform. The implementation of higher VAT rates and environmental levies, 
combined with the reform package (tax reduction), would generate an additional 4.3% in 
terms of after-tax income to make taxpayers better off. For example, one could ask for an 
even lower flat rate or tax credits to be targeted at specific groups. In this context, one 
could easily establish the same distributional effects as the Income Tax Act 2001. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In this article, we simulate a simple broad base/flat rate individual income tax system and 
we compare the distribution of the current individual income tax including social 
contributions in the Netherlands to the distribution of the simulated flat rate tax. Our 
simulations indicate that a proportional rate of 27.7% would be possible (with the same 
revenue). Such a flat rate causes only relatively small changes in the distribution of 
average tax ratios. For the majority of  taxpayers, the effect on after-tax income lies within 
a range of approximately 5%. We conclude that the income effects of the broad base/flat 
rate individual income tax would be relatively small given the scope of the operation.   
 
We should, however, mention that the elimination of large deductions will probably have 
serious economic consequences associated with behavioural responses, for instance with 
regard to savings. Also, a drastic reform such as the one envisaged would involve a rather 
long transition period, partly because of timing and capitalization problems. Nevertheless, 
the idea of a flat tax can and should be taken seriously in further debates on tax reform. 
 
